The General Theory of Capital: Self-Reproduction of Humans Through Increasing Meanings - страница 4

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The self-reproduction of man as a cultural being is based on the evolution of all three aspects of human activity: abstract, social and material.

(1) The evolution of the abstract side of activity consists in the development of thinking (intelligence or reason), i.e. complex types of adaptation based on the repetition and specialization of signals (stimuli) and an enlargement of the brain. From this side, meaning is a reflection (description, mediation) of the immediate environment in the mind and activity of an animal, that is, an abstract action.

Human thinking evolved as an abstract act, but it remains a deeply emotional act rooted in animal instincts. Human activities are meaningful—they are based on gathering, sorting and processing information, accumulating knowledge and skills (experience), applying experience to solve problems. Collectively, this is called reason or intellect. But intelligence is only the tip of a vast array of dumb processes that grow out of cultural learning (cf. Henrich 2016, p. 12). We call practices those behaviors that are based on learning, such as morals, mores, techniques, customs, etc. Thousands and tens of thousands of generations of humans have produced practices that have proven to be “smarter” than the intelligence of any individual or even a group. Natural evolution affects simple processes—instincts—that allow animals to adapt to a complex natural environment. Cultural evolution also affects simple processes—practices—that allow humans to adapt to their complex natural and artificial environments. Instincts, practices and intelligence are three basic types of behavioral acts, the distinction between which goes back to the works of Darwin (Krushinsky 1986, p. 134; Zorina and Smirnova 2006, p. 42).

(2) The evolution of the social aspect of activity relies on the human ability to transmit complex types of adaptation through non-genetic mechanisms, through communicating, and above all, through learning. Meaning is a social abstraction: it exists only in the joint activities of humans as subjects of culture.

Sociality is not an exclusively human trait. Although communication among apes is thought to amount to the exchange of emotions, in reality they go beyond emotional contact and exchange referential signals: they do not only signal danger, but also indicate the type of approaching predator. This ability to give referential signals is not innate, but develops in apes as they learn at a young age (cf. King 2001, p. 33). Both animals and humans exchange signals that convey messages (information). However, the form and content of human signals differ from those of animal signals. If animal signals act as stimuli that require a direct, emotional reaction, then human signals are symbols that require an indirect, abstract reaction. Although a signal shows that something has happened and what the response might be, it does not require modeling of a situation (event) or programming of an action. In contrast to a simple signal, a symbol presupposes an event model and a response model appropriate for a particular event (cf. Friedman 2019, part 1, p. 24).

As is known, apes are able to learn symbolic language, for example, Amslen or Yerkish (Zorina and Smirnova 2006, pp. 137 ff.). But they cannot learn human language—not only because of the peculiarities of anatomy, but also because their vocal responses are involuntary and purely emotional (Zorina and Smirnova 2006, pp. 103-4). Human symbols, and especially language, evolved from gestures, sounds and other signals exchanged between animals. According to George Mead, vocal gestures were of utmost importance for the emergence of symbols, since they modeled not only the behavior of the addressees, but also that of the authors of stimuli (Mead 1972, pp. 61 ff.). According to Vladimir Friedman’s hypothesis, the stimuli shifted toward symbols when proto-symbols (“demonstrations”) differed both from animals’ immediate actions towards each other and from their emotional reactions that expressed their internal states (Friedman 2019, part 1, p. 59).